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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0040
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85066598946
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Book Chapter: Shared Content
Title | Shared Content |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Observation Thought Sentences Proposition Assertion Contexts of utterance |
Issue Date | 2006 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press. |
Citation | Shared Content. In Lepore, E and Smith, BC (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, p. 1020-1055. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 How to Cite? |
Abstract | A general and fundamental tension surrounds our concept of what is said. On the one hand, what is said (asserted, claimed, stated, etc.) by utterances of a significant range of sentences is highly context sensitive. More specifically, (Observation 1), what these sentences can be used to say depends on their contexts of utterance. On the other hand, speakers face no difficulty whatsoever in using many of these sentences to say (or make) the exact same claim, assertion, etc., across a wide array of contexts. More specifically, (Observation 2), many of the sentences in support of (Observation 1) can be used to express the same thought, the same proposition, across a wide range of different contexts. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286991 |
ISBN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Cappelen, Herman | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lepore, Ernest | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-07T11:46:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-07T11:46:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Shared Content. In Lepore, E and Smith, BC (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, p. 1020-1055. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780199259410 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286991 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A general and fundamental tension surrounds our concept of what is said. On the one hand, what is said (asserted, claimed, stated, etc.) by utterances of a significant range of sentences is highly context sensitive. More specifically, (Observation 1), what these sentences can be used to say depends on their contexts of utterance. On the other hand, speakers face no difficulty whatsoever in using many of these sentences to say (or make) the exact same claim, assertion, etc., across a wide array of contexts. More specifically, (Observation 2), many of the sentences in support of (Observation 1) can be used to express the same thought, the same proposition, across a wide range of different contexts. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language | - |
dc.subject | Observation | - |
dc.subject | Thought | - |
dc.subject | Sentences | - |
dc.subject | Proposition | - |
dc.subject | Assertion | - |
dc.subject | Contexts of utterance | - |
dc.title | Shared Content | - |
dc.type | Book_Chapter | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0040 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85066598946 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1020 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1055 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Oxford | - |