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Book Chapter: Replies to the Commentaries

TitleReplies to the Commentaries
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherRoutledge.
Citation
Replies to the Commentaries. In Murasugi, K, Stainton, R (Eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics, p. 279-285. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019 How to Cite?
AbstractBefore we begin our replies, we want to press a non-philosophical consideration we think dictates how any serious criticism of our unified account of quotation must go. Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation is not the sort of account a student of natural language semantics would conjure up on a first go around. (Are there any?) Rather it's the sort of account a semanticist is led to only after having canvassed one hundred years of reasonable (and unreasonable) failed alternatives. That's at least how we came to it. Surprisingly, though, it was not that account that inclined us towards our unified account for mixed quotation. It was, rather, Davidson's comparatively little-discussed theory of pure quotation. We find this account not only a plausible start (much like we do his account of indirect quotation), but compelling. (One of us thinks he has an argument for the conclusion that the demonstrative account of pure quotation must be correct.) Our reason for indulging in autobiography is that if you see where we're coming from, it will be easier to see how our commentators stumble.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/287010
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCappelen, Herman-
dc.contributor.authorLepore, Ernie-
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-07T11:46:15Z-
dc.date.available2020-09-07T11:46:15Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationReplies to the Commentaries. In Murasugi, K, Stainton, R (Eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics, p. 279-285. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019-
dc.identifier.isbn9780367282868-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/287010-
dc.description.abstractBefore we begin our replies, we want to press a non-philosophical consideration we think dictates how any serious criticism of our unified account of quotation must go. Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation is not the sort of account a student of natural language semantics would conjure up on a first go around. (Are there any?) Rather it's the sort of account a semanticist is led to only after having canvassed one hundred years of reasonable (and unreasonable) failed alternatives. That's at least how we came to it. Surprisingly, though, it was not that account that inclined us towards our unified account for mixed quotation. It was, rather, Davidson's comparatively little-discussed theory of pure quotation. We find this account not only a plausible start (much like we do his account of indirect quotation), but compelling. (One of us thinks he has an argument for the conclusion that the demonstrative account of pure quotation must be correct.) Our reason for indulging in autobiography is that if you see where we're coming from, it will be easier to see how our commentators stumble.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherRoutledge.-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Linguistics-
dc.titleReplies to the Commentaries-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.4324/9780429301612-12-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85077299611-
dc.identifier.spage279-
dc.identifier.epage285-
dc.publisher.placeNew York, NY-

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