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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123881
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85090751558
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Article: Auction-based cloud service allocation and sharing for logistics product service system
Title | Auction-based cloud service allocation and sharing for logistics product service system |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Logistics services Product service systems Auction Cloud service allocation and sharing |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro |
Citation | Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020, v. 278, p. article no. 123881 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Sustainability is increasingly viewed as a desired goal of social development. The logistics industry without exception is aware of the importance of sustainable development. To achieve this goal, the logistics industry is leveraging cutting-edge technologies, such as product service systems (PSS) and cloud manufacturing (CMfg), to design logistics product service systems (LPSS). In LPSS, public logistics resources are allocated to customers and private logistics resources are shared between customers. However, logistics resource allocation and sharing services have been impeded by a lack of efficient methods. In this context, this paper proposes an auction-based cloud service allocation and sharing method for LPSS. Firstly, LPSS is defined and elaborated based on the adoption of PSS in the logistics industry. Secondly, multi-unit Vickery (MV) auctions and one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) combinatorial auctions are proposed to address logistics resource allocation and sharing problems respectively in LPSS. Two auctions are introduced specifically, and their relevant properties are investigated, including incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. Thirdly, computational studies are conducted to examine the performance of two auctions. The results reveal that MV auctions can efficiently allocate public logistics resources through ensuring the utility of logistics service providers under dynamic supply and demand. Additionally, O-VCG auctions can effectively integrate and share idle private logistics resources, which promotes sustainability in the logistics industry. Through integrating MV auctions with O-VCG auctions, the utility of logistics service providers can be increased. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/287103 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 9.7 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.058 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | KANG, K | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhong, RY | - |
dc.contributor.author | Xu, SX | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tan, BQ | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, L | - |
dc.contributor.author | Peng, T | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-22T02:55:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-22T02:55:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020, v. 278, p. article no. 123881 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0959-6526 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/287103 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Sustainability is increasingly viewed as a desired goal of social development. The logistics industry without exception is aware of the importance of sustainable development. To achieve this goal, the logistics industry is leveraging cutting-edge technologies, such as product service systems (PSS) and cloud manufacturing (CMfg), to design logistics product service systems (LPSS). In LPSS, public logistics resources are allocated to customers and private logistics resources are shared between customers. However, logistics resource allocation and sharing services have been impeded by a lack of efficient methods. In this context, this paper proposes an auction-based cloud service allocation and sharing method for LPSS. Firstly, LPSS is defined and elaborated based on the adoption of PSS in the logistics industry. Secondly, multi-unit Vickery (MV) auctions and one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) combinatorial auctions are proposed to address logistics resource allocation and sharing problems respectively in LPSS. Two auctions are introduced specifically, and their relevant properties are investigated, including incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. Thirdly, computational studies are conducted to examine the performance of two auctions. The results reveal that MV auctions can efficiently allocate public logistics resources through ensuring the utility of logistics service providers under dynamic supply and demand. Additionally, O-VCG auctions can effectively integrate and share idle private logistics resources, which promotes sustainability in the logistics industry. Through integrating MV auctions with O-VCG auctions, the utility of logistics service providers can be increased. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Cleaner Production | - |
dc.subject | Logistics services | - |
dc.subject | Product service systems | - |
dc.subject | Auction | - |
dc.subject | Cloud service allocation and sharing | - |
dc.title | Auction-based cloud service allocation and sharing for logistics product service system | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Zhong, RY: zhongzry@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Zhong, RY=rp02116 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123881 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85090751558 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 314296 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 278 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 123881 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 123881 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000592392000003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0959-6526 | - |