How to Engage in Illegal Transactions: Resolving Risk and Uncertainty in Corrupt Dealings

Abstract

How do exchange participants address risk in illegal transactions? The socio-cultural literature examines risk from cultural, ‘risk society’ and ‘governmentality’ perspectives, but there is relatively little empirical work focusing on the ways in which people experience and handle risk in illegal markets. Drawing on insights from criminology, economic sociology and social psychology, this article aims to contribute to the study of risk and uncertainty under conditions of illegality. It investigates a popular type of corrupt exchange in China: the buying and selling of government positions that are embedded in the power-imbalanced patron–client relation. The article examines the difference in risk faced by buyers and sellers and explores how they manage these transaction risks without resorting to state protection mechanisms (e.g. the police and courts). The article is based on 61 in-depth interviews with academics, journalists and state officials and a review of official documents and news reports in Chinese and English.