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Book Chapter: Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument
Title | Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | conceptual engineering metasemantics ameliorative projects verbal disputes externalism |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Citation | Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument. In Burgess, A ; Cappelen, H & Plunkett, D (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, p. 132-151. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This chapter develops and defends the Master Argument for Conceptual Engineering: (1) If W is a word that has a meaning M, then there are many similar meanings, M1,M2,...,Mn, W could have. (2) We have no good reason to think that the meaning that W ended up with is the best meaning W could have: there will typically be indefinitely many alternative meanings that would be better meanings for W. (3) When we speak, think, and theorize it’s important to make sure our words have as good meanings as possible. (4) As a corollary: when doing philosophy, we should try to find good meanings for core philosophical terms and they will typically not be the meanings those words as a matter of fact have. (5) So no matter what topic a philosopher is concerned with, she should assess and ameliorate the meanings of central terms. I respond to seven objections to this argument. |
Description | Chapter 7 |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290367 |
ISBN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Burgess, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Cappelen, HW | - |
dc.contributor.author | Plunkett, D | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-27T03:34:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-10-27T03:34:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument. In Burgess, A ; Cappelen, H & Plunkett, D (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, p. 132-151. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780198801856 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290367 | - |
dc.description | Chapter 7 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This chapter develops and defends the Master Argument for Conceptual Engineering: (1) If W is a word that has a meaning M, then there are many similar meanings, M1,M2,...,Mn, W could have. (2) We have no good reason to think that the meaning that W ended up with is the best meaning W could have: there will typically be indefinitely many alternative meanings that would be better meanings for W. (3) When we speak, think, and theorize it’s important to make sure our words have as good meanings as possible. (4) As a corollary: when doing philosophy, we should try to find good meanings for core philosophical terms and they will typically not be the meanings those words as a matter of fact have. (5) So no matter what topic a philosopher is concerned with, she should assess and ameliorate the meanings of central terms. I respond to seven objections to this argument. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics | - |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.subject | conceptual engineering | - |
dc.subject | metasemantics | - |
dc.subject | ameliorative projects | - |
dc.subject | verbal disputes | - |
dc.subject | externalism | - |
dc.title | Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument | - |
dc.type | Book_Chapter | - |
dc.identifier.email | Cappelen, HW: hwcapp@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Cappelen, HW=rp02716 | - |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0007 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 326959 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 132 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 151 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Oxford, UK | - |