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Article: Learning to Game the System
Title | Learning to Game the System |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/restud/ |
Citation | The Review of Economic Studies, 2020, Epub 2020-10-14 How to Cite? |
Abstract | An agent may privately learn which aspects of his job are more important by shirking on some of them, and use that information to shirk more effectively in the future. In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking, and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement/adoption policies that dilute the agent’s information rents from learning how to game the system. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290830 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 13.609 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Li, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Mukherjee, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Vasconcelos, L | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-02T05:47:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-02T05:47:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The Review of Economic Studies, 2020, Epub 2020-10-14 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0034-6527 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290830 | - |
dc.description.abstract | An agent may privately learn which aspects of his job are more important by shirking on some of them, and use that information to shirk more effectively in the future. In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking, and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement/adoption policies that dilute the agent’s information rents from learning how to game the system. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/restud/ | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Review of Economic Studies | - |
dc.rights | Pre-print: Journal Title] ©: [year] [owner as specified on the article] Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of xxxxxx]. All rights reserved. Pre-print (Once an article is published, preprint notice should be amended to): This is an electronic version of an article published in [include the complete citation information for the final version of the Article as published in the print edition of the Journal.] Post-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here]. | - |
dc.title | Learning to Game the System | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Li, J: jli1@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Li, J=rp02406 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/restud/rdaa065 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 318188 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Epub 2020-10-14 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000710586200013 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0034-6527 | - |