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Article: Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game
Title | Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game |
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Authors | |
Keywords | bullwhip effect rationing game order variance supply uncertainty reverse bullwhip effect |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | Naval Research Logistics, 2017, v. 64, n. 3, p. 203-216 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296154 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.260 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Rong, Ying | - |
dc.contributor.author | Snyder, Lawrence V. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Naval Research Logistics, 2017, v. 64, n. 3, p. 203-216 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0894-069X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296154 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Naval Research Logistics | - |
dc.subject | bullwhip effect | - |
dc.subject | rationing game | - |
dc.subject | order variance | - |
dc.subject | supply uncertainty | - |
dc.subject | reverse bullwhip effect | - |
dc.title | Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/nav.21745 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85021783857 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 64 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 203 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 216 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1520-6750 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000404722400002 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0894-069X | - |