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Article: A balancing act of regulating on-demand ride services

TitleA balancing act of regulating on-demand ride services
Authors
KeywordsPublic policy
Consumer welfare
Social welfare
On-demand ride services
Issue Date2020
Citation
Management Science, 2020, v. 66, n. 7, p. 2975-2992 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2019 INFORMS Regulating on-demand ride-hailing services (e.g., Uber and DiDi) requires a balance of multiple competing objectives: encouraging innovative business models (e.g., DiDi), sustaining traditional industries (e.g., taxi), creating new jobs, and reducing traffic congestion. This study is motivated by a regulatory policy implemented by the Chinese government in 2017 and a similar policy approved by the New York City Council in 2018 that regulate the “maximum” number of registered Uber/DiDi drivers. We examine the impact of these policies on the welfare of different stakeholders (i.e., consumers, taxi drivers, on-demand ride service company, and independent drivers). By analyzing a two-period dynamic game that involves these stakeholders, we find that, without government intervention, the on-demand ride service platform can drive the traditional taxi industry out of the market under certain conditions. Relative to no regulations and a complete ban policy, a carefully designed regulatory policy can strike a better balance of multiple competing objectives. Finally, if a government can reform the taxi industry by adjusting the taxi fare, then lowering the taxi fare instead of imposing a strict policy toward on-demand ride services can improve the total social welfare.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/296262
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 6.172
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.954
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYu, Jiayi Joey-
dc.contributor.authorTang, Christopher S.-
dc.contributor.authorShen, Zuo Jun Max-
dc.contributor.authorChen, Xiqun Michael-
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-11T04:53:11Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-11T04:53:11Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationManagement Science, 2020, v. 66, n. 7, p. 2975-2992-
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/296262-
dc.description.abstract© 2019 INFORMS Regulating on-demand ride-hailing services (e.g., Uber and DiDi) requires a balance of multiple competing objectives: encouraging innovative business models (e.g., DiDi), sustaining traditional industries (e.g., taxi), creating new jobs, and reducing traffic congestion. This study is motivated by a regulatory policy implemented by the Chinese government in 2017 and a similar policy approved by the New York City Council in 2018 that regulate the “maximum” number of registered Uber/DiDi drivers. We examine the impact of these policies on the welfare of different stakeholders (i.e., consumers, taxi drivers, on-demand ride service company, and independent drivers). By analyzing a two-period dynamic game that involves these stakeholders, we find that, without government intervention, the on-demand ride service platform can drive the traditional taxi industry out of the market under certain conditions. Relative to no regulations and a complete ban policy, a carefully designed regulatory policy can strike a better balance of multiple competing objectives. Finally, if a government can reform the taxi industry by adjusting the taxi fare, then lowering the taxi fare instead of imposing a strict policy toward on-demand ride services can improve the total social welfare.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofManagement Science-
dc.subjectPublic policy-
dc.subjectConsumer welfare-
dc.subjectSocial welfare-
dc.subjectOn-demand ride services-
dc.titleA balancing act of regulating on-demand ride services-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2019.3351-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85084982316-
dc.identifier.volume66-
dc.identifier.issue7-
dc.identifier.spage2975-
dc.identifier.epage2992-
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000555783900009-
dc.identifier.issnl0025-1909-

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