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Article: Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement
Title | Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement |
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Authors | |
Keywords | political connections elections regulation |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Publisher | INFORMS. The Journal's web site is located at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org |
Citation | Management Science, 2021, Epub 2021-03-10 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We examine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uniformly enforces the Clean Air Act for politically connected and unconnected firms using a close election setting. We find no difference in regulated pollutant emissions or EPA investigations between the two groups, although connected firms experience less regulatory enforcement and lower penalties. These results are more pronounced for firms connected to politicians capable of influencing regulatory bureaucrats and for connected firms that are more important to their supported politicians. Taken together, our results show that campaign contributions can indirectly benefit firms by way of reduced environmental regulatory enforcement and penalties. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/297665 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.438 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Heitz, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | WANG, Y | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Z | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-23T04:20:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-03-23T04:20:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Management Science, 2021, Epub 2021-03-10 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0025-1909 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/297665 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uniformly enforces the Clean Air Act for politically connected and unconnected firms using a close election setting. We find no difference in regulated pollutant emissions or EPA investigations between the two groups, although connected firms experience less regulatory enforcement and lower penalties. These results are more pronounced for firms connected to politicians capable of influencing regulatory bureaucrats and for connected firms that are more important to their supported politicians. Taken together, our results show that campaign contributions can indirectly benefit firms by way of reduced environmental regulatory enforcement and penalties. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | INFORMS. The Journal's web site is located at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Management Science | - |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.subject | political connections | - |
dc.subject | elections | - |
dc.subject | regulation | - |
dc.title | Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, Z: wangzg@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wang, Z=rp02039 | - |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3931 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 321904 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Epub 2021-03-10 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000752374100001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |