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Book Chapter: Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions

TitleTheory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions
Authors
Issue Date2003
PublisherFrank Cass.
Citation
Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. In Thatcher, M, Stone Sweet, A (Eds.). The Politics of Delegation, p. 1-22. London: Frank Cass, 2003 How to Cite?
AbstractThe chapter summarises the analytical frameworks, questions, and empirical findings of the volume. It defines the key concepts used. It then sets out the principal-agent framework that explains delegation to NMIs through functional logics for principals. It sets out alternative explanations based on sociological and historical institutionalism. Thereafter, it relates the empirical findings of the volume to these wider debates about delegation. It argues that although functional demands for delegation can almost always be identified, purely functional accounts of delegation to NMIs are inadequate. Explaining the decision to delegate and the institutional forms of that delegation involves including and specifying interests, policy learning/institutional isomorphism and institutional inheritances. Delegation has also had major consequences on the distribution of power, policy making processes and substantive policy choices, both through its direct effects, and via feedback effects. Finally, delegation has raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of NMIs. © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/300177
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorThatcher, M-
dc.contributor.authorStone Sweet, A-
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-04T05:49:13Z-
dc.date.available2021-06-04T05:49:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.citationTheory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. In Thatcher, M, Stone Sweet, A (Eds.). The Politics of Delegation, p. 1-22. London: Frank Cass, 2003-
dc.identifier.isbn9780714655611-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/300177-
dc.description.abstractThe chapter summarises the analytical frameworks, questions, and empirical findings of the volume. It defines the key concepts used. It then sets out the principal-agent framework that explains delegation to NMIs through functional logics for principals. It sets out alternative explanations based on sociological and historical institutionalism. Thereafter, it relates the empirical findings of the volume to these wider debates about delegation. It argues that although functional demands for delegation can almost always be identified, purely functional accounts of delegation to NMIs are inadequate. Explaining the decision to delegate and the institutional forms of that delegation involves including and specifying interests, policy learning/institutional isomorphism and institutional inheritances. Delegation has also had major consequences on the distribution of power, policy making processes and substantive policy choices, both through its direct effects, and via feedback effects. Finally, delegation has raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of NMIs. © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. All rights reserved.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherFrank Cass.-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Politics of Delegation-
dc.titleTheory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.4324/9780203005989-2-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84905960511-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage22-
dc.publisher.placeLondon-

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