File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105031
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85082006904
- WOS: WOS:000528202000011
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Inefficient sorting under output sharing
Title | Inefficient sorting under output sharing |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Linkage principle Sorting Directed search Assortative matching Hosios condition Linear contracts |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, v. 187, article no. 105031 How to Cite? |
Abstract | I study sorting in a frictional market. Asset owners post their terms, then workers direct their search. When the owners switch from prices to shares, the competition between workers is handicapped. The unique equilibrium features inefficient positive assortative matching. The queue lengths are distorted, even though the Hosios efficiency condition holds for every pair of types. For any distribution of types, all workers pair up with better assets. The best workers suffer while the weakest workers gain; the opposite occurs on the asset side. Competition drives the asset owners to post flatter contracts. It leads to constrained efficiency whenever prices are feasible. Otherwise, handicapped competition results in inefficient sorting. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/302254 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lam, Wing Tung | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-30T13:58:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-30T13:58:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, v. 187, article no. 105031 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/302254 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I study sorting in a frictional market. Asset owners post their terms, then workers direct their search. When the owners switch from prices to shares, the competition between workers is handicapped. The unique equilibrium features inefficient positive assortative matching. The queue lengths are distorted, even though the Hosios efficiency condition holds for every pair of types. For any distribution of types, all workers pair up with better assets. The best workers suffer while the weakest workers gain; the opposite occurs on the asset side. Competition drives the asset owners to post flatter contracts. It leads to constrained efficiency whenever prices are feasible. Otherwise, handicapped competition results in inefficient sorting. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | - |
dc.subject | Linkage principle | - |
dc.subject | Sorting | - |
dc.subject | Directed search | - |
dc.subject | Assortative matching | - |
dc.subject | Hosios condition | - |
dc.subject | Linear contracts | - |
dc.title | Inefficient sorting under output sharing | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105031 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85082006904 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 187 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 105031 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 105031 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1095-7235 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000528202000011 | - |