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Conference Paper: Efficient protection of path-sensitive control security
Title | Efficient protection of path-sensitive control security |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | The 26th USENIX Security Symposium, Vancouver, Canada, 16-18 August 2017. In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2017, p. 131-148 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), as a means to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks, enforces that each instruction transfers control to an address in a set of valid targets. The security guarantee of CFI thus depends on the definition of valid targets, which conventionally are defined as the result of a static analysis. Unfortunately, previous research has demonstrated that such a definition, and thus any implementation that enforces it, still allows practical control-flow attacks. In this work, we present a path-sensitive variation of CFI that utilizes runtime path-sensitive point-to analysis to compute the legitimate control transfer targets. We have designed and implemented a runtime environment, PITTYPAT, that enforces path-sensitive CFI efficiently by combining commodity, low-overhead hardware monitoring and a novel runtime points-to analysis. Our formal analysis and empirical evaluation demonstrate that, compared to CFI based on static analysis, PITTYPAT ensures that applications satisfy stronger security guarantees, with acceptable overhead for security-critical contexts. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/303635 |
ISBN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ding, Ren | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qian, Chenxiong | - |
dc.contributor.author | Song, Chengyu | - |
dc.contributor.author | Harris, William | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Taesoo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Wenke | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-15T08:25:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-15T08:25:43Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The 26th USENIX Security Symposium, Vancouver, Canada, 16-18 August 2017. In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2017, p. 131-148 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781931971409 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/303635 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), as a means to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks, enforces that each instruction transfers control to an address in a set of valid targets. The security guarantee of CFI thus depends on the definition of valid targets, which conventionally are defined as the result of a static analysis. Unfortunately, previous research has demonstrated that such a definition, and thus any implementation that enforces it, still allows practical control-flow attacks. In this work, we present a path-sensitive variation of CFI that utilizes runtime path-sensitive point-to analysis to compute the legitimate control transfer targets. We have designed and implemented a runtime environment, PITTYPAT, that enforces path-sensitive CFI efficiently by combining commodity, low-overhead hardware monitoring and a novel runtime points-to analysis. Our formal analysis and empirical evaluation demonstrate that, compared to CFI based on static analysis, PITTYPAT ensures that applications satisfy stronger security guarantees, with acceptable overhead for security-critical contexts. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium | - |
dc.title | Efficient protection of path-sensitive control security | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_OA_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85076223122 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 131 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 148 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000428763700009 | - |