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- Publisher Website: 10.1007/s11098-018-1062-2
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85042433860
- WOS: WOS:000462998500008
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Article: Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit
Title | Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Desire Rationality Probability Promotion Humeanism |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Citation | Philosophical Studies, 2019, v. 176, n. 5, p. 1263-1290 How to Cite? |
Abstract | What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is contrastive, in that actions promote the satisfaction of desires only as contrasted with other possible actions. Second, it employs a notion of expected fit between desire and world, defined as the weighted sum of the fit between the desire and the world in all possible outcomes, where each weight is given by the probability of the agent’s obtaining the relevant outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expected fit for the desire given that the agent performs the action is greater than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting action. We highlight this account’s attractive features and explain how it improves on its competitors. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/303758 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.203 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Sharadin, Nathaniel | - |
dc.contributor.author | Dellsén, Finnur | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-15T08:25:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-15T08:25:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Philosophical Studies, 2019, v. 176, n. 5, p. 1263-1290 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8116 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/303758 | - |
dc.description.abstract | What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is contrastive, in that actions promote the satisfaction of desires only as contrasted with other possible actions. Second, it employs a notion of expected fit between desire and world, defined as the weighted sum of the fit between the desire and the world in all possible outcomes, where each weight is given by the probability of the agent’s obtaining the relevant outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expected fit for the desire given that the agent performs the action is greater than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting action. We highlight this account’s attractive features and explain how it improves on its competitors. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Philosophical Studies | - |
dc.subject | Desire | - |
dc.subject | Rationality | - |
dc.subject | Probability | - |
dc.subject | Promotion | - |
dc.subject | Humeanism | - |
dc.title | Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11098-018-1062-2 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85042433860 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 176 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1263 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1290 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1573-0883 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000462998500008 | - |