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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.tra.2019.12.018
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85077182287
- WOS: WOS:000514014700046
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Article: Analysis of multi-modal commute behavior with feeding and competing ridesplitting services
Title | Analysis of multi-modal commute behavior with feeding and competing ridesplitting services |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Choice modeling First-mile and last-mile problem Public transit ridership Ridesplitting program |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Citation | Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2020, v. 132, p. 713-727 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Public transit is an essential travel mode in many urban areas. Emerging dynamic ridesplitting programs provided by transportation network companies (TNCs) can be a double-edged sword to public transit. On the one hand, the program provides convenient services to solve first- and last-mile problems. On the other hand, long-distance ridesplitting services may also draw passengers away from public transit. In this paper, we propose a network model to analyze multi-modal commute behavior with ridesplitting programs as both feeders and competitors to public transit, which is with limited accessibility to passengers. The ridesplitting priority and ridesplitting fare ratio (i.e., ridesplitting fare over non-ridesplitting fare) are incorporated as operational strategies of the TNC. Through numerical studies, we find that a significant number of public transit passengers will shift to long-distance ridesplitting services under low fare ratios; and a high ridesplitting priority can lead to a demand drawback for long-distance ridesplitting, which raises public transit ridership. To maintain public transit ridership, the TNC needs to keep a high fare ratio and a high priority; meanwhile, the number of short-distance ridesplitting orders can also decrease dramatically, which may lead to a loss in unit time revenue of the TNC. We note that a win–win condition can be reached through a separated discount strategy for first- and last-mile ridesplitting services. Such a strategy can both increase the number of short-distance ridesplitting orders for the TNC and boost transit ridership for the government, as well as provide low-cost services to passengers. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/308803 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.3 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.182 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zhu, Zheng | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qin, Xiaoran | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ke, Jintao | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zheng, Zhengfei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yang, Hai | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-08T07:50:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-12-08T07:50:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2020, v. 132, p. 713-727 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0965-8564 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/308803 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Public transit is an essential travel mode in many urban areas. Emerging dynamic ridesplitting programs provided by transportation network companies (TNCs) can be a double-edged sword to public transit. On the one hand, the program provides convenient services to solve first- and last-mile problems. On the other hand, long-distance ridesplitting services may also draw passengers away from public transit. In this paper, we propose a network model to analyze multi-modal commute behavior with ridesplitting programs as both feeders and competitors to public transit, which is with limited accessibility to passengers. The ridesplitting priority and ridesplitting fare ratio (i.e., ridesplitting fare over non-ridesplitting fare) are incorporated as operational strategies of the TNC. Through numerical studies, we find that a significant number of public transit passengers will shift to long-distance ridesplitting services under low fare ratios; and a high ridesplitting priority can lead to a demand drawback for long-distance ridesplitting, which raises public transit ridership. To maintain public transit ridership, the TNC needs to keep a high fare ratio and a high priority; meanwhile, the number of short-distance ridesplitting orders can also decrease dramatically, which may lead to a loss in unit time revenue of the TNC. We note that a win–win condition can be reached through a separated discount strategy for first- and last-mile ridesplitting services. Such a strategy can both increase the number of short-distance ridesplitting orders for the TNC and boost transit ridership for the government, as well as provide low-cost services to passengers. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice | - |
dc.subject | Choice modeling | - |
dc.subject | First-mile and last-mile problem | - |
dc.subject | Public transit ridership | - |
dc.subject | Ridesplitting program | - |
dc.title | Analysis of multi-modal commute behavior with feeding and competing ridesplitting services | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.tra.2019.12.018 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85077182287 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 132 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 713 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 727 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000514014700046 | - |