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Conference Paper: One-More Unforgeability of Blind ECDSA

TitleOne-More Unforgeability of Blind ECDSA
Authors
QIN, XCAI, CYuen, TH
KeywordsBlind signature
ECDSA
One-more unforgeability
Issue Date2021
PublisherSpringer.
Citation
26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2021), Darmstadt, Germany, 4-8 October 2021. In Bertino, E ... et al (eds.), Proceedings, Part II, p. 313-331 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_16
AbstractIn this paper, we give the first formal security analysis on the one-more unforgeability of blind ECDSA. We start with giving a general attack on blind ECDSA, which is similar to the ROS attack on the blind Schnorr signature. We formulate the ECDSA-ROS problem to capture this attack. Next, we give a generic construction of blind ECDSA based on an additive homomorphic encryption and a corresponding zero-knowledge proof. Our concrete instantiation is about 40 times more bandwidth efficient than the blind ECDSA in AsiaCCS 2019. After that, we give the first formal proof of one-more unforgeability for blind ECDSA, under a new model called algebraic bijective random oracle. The security of our generic blind ECDSA relies on the hardness of a discrete logarithm-based interactive assumption and an assumption of the underlying elliptic curve. Finally, we analyze the hardness of the ECDSA-ROS problem in the algebraic bijective random oracle model.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/311867
ISBN
9783030884277
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000772619000016
Series/Report no.Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNSC) ; v. 12973

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQIN, X-
dc.contributor.authorCAI, C-
dc.contributor.authorYuen, TH-
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-01T09:14:14Z-
dc.date.available2022-04-01T09:14:14Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citation26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2021), Darmstadt, Germany, 4-8 October 2021. In Bertino, E ... et al (eds.), Proceedings, Part II, p. 313-331-
dc.identifier.isbn9783030884277-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/311867-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we give the first formal security analysis on the one-more unforgeability of blind ECDSA. We start with giving a general attack on blind ECDSA, which is similar to the ROS attack on the blind Schnorr signature. We formulate the ECDSA-ROS problem to capture this attack. Next, we give a generic construction of blind ECDSA based on an additive homomorphic encryption and a corresponding zero-knowledge proof. Our concrete instantiation is about 40 times more bandwidth efficient than the blind ECDSA in AsiaCCS 2019. After that, we give the first formal proof of one-more unforgeability for blind ECDSA, under a new model called algebraic bijective random oracle. The security of our generic blind ECDSA relies on the hardness of a discrete logarithm-based interactive assumption and an assumption of the underlying elliptic curve. Finally, we analyze the hardness of the ECDSA-ROS problem in the algebraic bijective random oracle model.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer.-
dc.relation.ispartof26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2021)-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNSC) ; v. 12973-
dc.subjectBlind signature-
dc.subjectECDSA-
dc.subjectOne-more unforgeability-
dc.titleOne-More Unforgeability of Blind ECDSA-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailYuen, TH: johnyuen@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityYuen, TH=rp02426-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_16-
dc.identifier.hkuros332479-
dc.identifier.spage313-
dc.identifier.epage331-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000772619000016-
dc.publisher.placeCham-

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