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Conference Paper: Tighter Security Proofs for Post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Multi-challenge Setting
Title | Tighter Security Proofs for Post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Multi-challenge Setting |
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Authors | |
Keywords | CCA KEM QROM Tight security |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Springer |
Citation | 18th International Conference, CANS 2019, Fuzhou, China, October 25–27, 2019. In Mu, Y, Deng, R, Huang, X (Eds), Cryptology and Network Security: 18th International Conference, CANS 2019, Fuzhou, China, October 25–27, 2019, Proceedings, p. 141-160. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Due to the threat posed by quantum computers, a series of works investigate the security of cryptographic schemes in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM) where the adversary can query the random oracle in superposition. In this paper, we present tighter security proofs of a generic transformations for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) in the QROM in the multi-challenge setting, where the reduction loss is independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts. In particular, we introduce the notion of multi-challenge OW-CPA (mOW-CPA) security, which captures the one-wayness of the underlying public key encryption (PKE) under chosen plaintext attack in the multi-challenge setting. We show that the multi-challenge IND-CCA (mIND-CCA) security of KEM can be reduced to the mOW-CPA security of the underlying PKE scheme (with δ -correctness) using transformation. Then we prove that the mOW-CPA security can be tightly reduced to the underlying post-quantum assumptions by showing the tight mOW-CPA security of two concrete PKE schemes based on LWE, where one is the Regev’s PKE scheme and the other is a variant of Frodo. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312056 |
ISBN | |
ISSN | 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.606 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
Series/Report no. | Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 11829 LNCS sublibrary. SL 4, Security and Cryptology |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Zhengyu | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wei, Puwen | - |
dc.contributor.author | Xue, Haiyang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-06T04:32:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-06T04:32:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 18th International Conference, CANS 2019, Fuzhou, China, October 25–27, 2019. In Mu, Y, Deng, R, Huang, X (Eds), Cryptology and Network Security: 18th International Conference, CANS 2019, Fuzhou, China, October 25–27, 2019, Proceedings, p. 141-160. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9783030315771 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312056 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Due to the threat posed by quantum computers, a series of works investigate the security of cryptographic schemes in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM) where the adversary can query the random oracle in superposition. In this paper, we present tighter security proofs of a generic transformations for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) in the QROM in the multi-challenge setting, where the reduction loss is independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts. In particular, we introduce the notion of multi-challenge OW-CPA (mOW-CPA) security, which captures the one-wayness of the underlying public key encryption (PKE) under chosen plaintext attack in the multi-challenge setting. We show that the multi-challenge IND-CCA (mIND-CCA) security of KEM can be reduced to the mOW-CPA security of the underlying PKE scheme (with δ -correctness) using transformation. Then we prove that the mOW-CPA security can be tightly reduced to the underlying post-quantum assumptions by showing the tight mOW-CPA security of two concrete PKE schemes based on LWE, where one is the Regev’s PKE scheme and the other is a variant of Frodo. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Cryptology and Network Security: 18th International Conference, CANS 2019, Fuzhou, China, October 25–27, 2019, Proceedings | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 11829 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | LNCS sublibrary. SL 4, Security and Cryptology | - |
dc.subject | CCA | - |
dc.subject | KEM | - |
dc.subject | QROM | - |
dc.subject | Tight security | - |
dc.title | Tighter Security Proofs for Post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Multi-challenge Setting | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-030-31578-8_8 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85075695086 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 141 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 160 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1611-3349 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000547783200008 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Cham, Switzerland | - |