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Article: Elite Capture and Corruption: The Influence of Elite Collusion on Village Elections and Rural Land Development in China

TitleElite Capture and Corruption: The Influence of Elite Collusion on Village Elections and Rural Land Development in China
Authors
Ruan, JWang, P
Issue Date2022
PublisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY
Citation
The China Quarterly, 2022, p. 1-16 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001217
AbstractThis article presents a qualitative empirical study of elite collusion and its influence on village elections and rural land development in China. Drawing on ethnographic data collected from two Chinese villages, it investigates how village cadres collude with other rural elites, using bribery, gift-giving and lavish banquets, to establish reciprocal ties with township officials and other public officials. Meanwhile, the officials make use of formal organizations to corruptly obtain profits and form alliances with village elites. The article examines how rural elites, especially village cadres, use this collusion to profit from the misuse of villagers’ collectively owned assets, the manipulation of village elections and the suppression of anti-corruption protests. It also offers new descriptive evidence of how recent reforms designed to strengthen the Party's overall leadership in rural governance may have actually facilitated elite capture and grassroots corruption.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/317464
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000854368300001

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRuan, J-
dc.contributor.authorWang, P-
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-07T10:20:59Z-
dc.date.available2022-10-07T10:20:59Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationThe China Quarterly, 2022, p. 1-16-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/317464-
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a qualitative empirical study of elite collusion and its influence on village elections and rural land development in China. Drawing on ethnographic data collected from two Chinese villages, it investigates how village cadres collude with other rural elites, using bribery, gift-giving and lavish banquets, to establish reciprocal ties with township officials and other public officials. Meanwhile, the officials make use of formal organizations to corruptly obtain profits and form alliances with village elites. The article examines how rural elites, especially village cadres, use this collusion to profit from the misuse of villagers’ collectively owned assets, the manipulation of village elections and the suppression of anti-corruption protests. It also offers new descriptive evidence of how recent reforms designed to strengthen the Party's overall leadership in rural governance may have actually facilitated elite capture and grassroots corruption.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY-
dc.relation.ispartofThe China Quarterly-
dc.rightsThe China Quarterly. Copyright © Cambridge University Press.-
dc.rightsThis article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder.-
dc.titleElite Capture and Corruption: The Influence of Elite Collusion on Village Elections and Rural Land Development in China-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailWang, P: pengwang@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWang, P=rp01936-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0305741022001217-
dc.identifier.hkuros337834-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage16-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000854368300001-

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