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Article: State Controlling Shareholders and Payout Policy

TitleState Controlling Shareholders and Payout Policy
Authors
Lin, CLiu, HNi, CZhang, B
Issue Date2022
Citation
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2022, Forthcoming How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109022001132
AbstractWe study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers—listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/322740

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, C-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, H-
dc.contributor.authorNi, C-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, B-
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-14T08:31:48Z-
dc.date.available2022-11-14T08:31:48Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2022, Forthcoming-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/322740-
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers—listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis-
dc.titleState Controlling Shareholders and Payout Policy-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLin, C: chenlin1@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLin, C=rp01808-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109022001132-
dc.identifier.hkuros342244-
dc.identifier.volumeForthcoming-

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