File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.009
- WOS: WOS:000927330400001
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Web of Science: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
Title | Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2023 |
Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, Forthcoming How to Cite? |
Abstract | We investigates how prior-biased inferences change players' strategic incentives and result in novel welfare implications in the canonical framework of strategic information transmission. The ex ante social welfare achieved in our model exceeds the upper bound characterized in the standard environment without prior bias. The welfare gain stems from the fact that the receiver's prior bias weakens the link between the sender's message and the receiver's response without contaminating the actual content of the messages. We further show that direct communication is optimal among all possible communication protocols in the presence of a sufficient degree of prior bias. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/324868 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Y | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lim, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhao, C | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-20T01:39:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-02-20T01:39:32Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, Forthcoming | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/324868 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigates how prior-biased inferences change players' strategic incentives and result in novel welfare implications in the canonical framework of strategic information transmission. The ex ante social welfare achieved in our model exceeds the upper bound characterized in the standard environment without prior bias. The welfare gain stems from the fact that the receiver's prior bias weakens the link between the sender's message and the receiver's response without contaminating the actual content of the messages. We further show that direct communication is optimal among all possible communication protocols in the presence of a sufficient degree of prior bias. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
dc.title | Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Zhao, C: czhao@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Zhao, C=rp02300 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.009 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 343624 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Forthcoming | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000927330400001 | - |