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- Publisher Website: 10.1007/s11146-023-09939-y
- WOS: WOS:000919711700001
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Article: Information Asymmetry with Heterogeneous Buyers and Sellers in the Housing Market
Title | Information Asymmetry with Heterogeneous Buyers and Sellers in the Housing Market |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2023 |
Publisher | Springer. |
Citation | The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2023 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This study examines how heterogeneous traders on both sides of transactions behave in the housing market under information asymmetry. Two types of buyers, namely, informed and uninformed buyers, correspond to local and non-local buyers in the empirical tests. Non-local housing buyers in Hong Kong pay a 2.8% premium over local buyers in the second-hand market for housing units with similar observable attributes. We distinguish real estate developers from sellers in the second-hand market. The former has an incentive and ability to reduce information asymmetry by providing a quality guarantee on the building structure and signaling with brand name, none of which can be fulfilled by sellers in the second-hand market. Empirical results show that developers’ efforts to reduce information asymmetry allow them to fetch a higher price than sellers in the second-hand market, holding property characteristics constant. Such efforts are particularly valued by uninformed buyers as non-local buyers prefer to purchase in the first-hand market rather than in the second-hand market, especially when the problem of information asymmetry is serious. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/324887 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Li, L | - |
dc.contributor.author | Chau, KW | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-20T01:40:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-02-20T01:40:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/324887 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines how heterogeneous traders on both sides of transactions behave in the housing market under information asymmetry. Two types of buyers, namely, informed and uninformed buyers, correspond to local and non-local buyers in the empirical tests. Non-local housing buyers in Hong Kong pay a 2.8% premium over local buyers in the second-hand market for housing units with similar observable attributes. We distinguish real estate developers from sellers in the second-hand market. The former has an incentive and ability to reduce information asymmetry by providing a quality guarantee on the building structure and signaling with brand name, none of which can be fulfilled by sellers in the second-hand market. Empirical results show that developers’ efforts to reduce information asymmetry allow them to fetch a higher price than sellers in the second-hand market, holding property characteristics constant. Such efforts are particularly valued by uninformed buyers as non-local buyers prefer to purchase in the first-hand market rather than in the second-hand market, especially when the problem of information asymmetry is serious. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | - |
dc.rights | This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/[insert DOI] | - |
dc.title | Information Asymmetry with Heterogeneous Buyers and Sellers in the Housing Market | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chau, KW: hrrbckw@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chau, KW=rp00993 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11146-023-09939-y | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 343714 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000919711700001 | - |