Immigration restrictions and the liberal state : does liberalism require open borders?

Abstract

Immigration restrictions limit the free movement of people between states. In doing so, they undoubtedly limit the scope of negative liberty, understood as freedom from constraint on individual action. They also limit the access that citizens of one country have to the opportunities and resources available within the borders of any other. In some instances, borders act to separate regions of prosperity and advantage from regions of poverty and strife. Because immigration restrictions are imposed on individuals by states with monopolies on the use of force (monopolies which they hold both at and within their borders) immigration restrictions are also coercive. It is in light of these considerations that some political theorists argue that immigration restrictions are conceptually incompatible with the commitments of liberalism to individual liberty and the moral equality of persons. If immigration restrictions can be shown to be in contradiction with the fundamental principles of liberalism, then anyone calling themselves a liberal academic, as well as the governments of purportedly liberal states, will have a moral reason, if not a moral obligation, to reject immigration restrictions.

This thesis refutes the claim that a commitment to liberalism entails acknowledgement of a duty, held by states, to refrain from excluding would-be immigrants, either because this exclusion restricts their freedom or autonomy in a manner incompatible with liberalism, or because this exclusion violates the liberal commitment to moral equality. In doing so, this thesis argues that each of these claims in fact relies upon an over-expansive account of the nature and scope of the moral rights (to individual freedom and to equality) presumed by liberal theory. Specifically, this thesis will argue that neither a concern with liberal freedom nor a concern with liberal equality, properly understood, is sufficient to generate a claim-right, held by would-be immigrants, against exclusion from access to and residence within foreign states, at least under ordinary circumstances. In other words, this thesis will argue that states possess no moral duty, arising from their commitment to liberal principles, to refrain from imposing immigration restrictions.