Experimental polities in times of crisis : executive empowerment in the European Union and the People's Republic of China in the early 2010s

Abstract

This thesis argues that although the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are radically different in their aspirations and ethos, in times of crisis and against conventional expectations, they act in a similar fashion and use emergency politics to empower the executive.

Using a historical institutionalist approach, the thesis examines how both polities are characterized by the use of an experimental framework, within which governance and policymaking is conducted. An experimental approach helps maintain the balance between a performance-enhancing decentralization and a taming of the centrifugal forces that decentralization inevitably creates. In the EU, experimentalism facilitates integration by allowing for the development of common institutions while at the same time taking into consideration the specific needs of the Member States. In the PRC, an experimental framework of governance combines the need for a decentralized approach towards policymaking in a vast country with diverse needs with the political requirements of state unity.

Crises can distort this balance and enhance fragmentation, which in turn creates demands on political actors to centralize. The case studies of the Eurozone crisis and the crisis of legitimacy surrounding China’s 2012 leadership succession demonstrate that the leading elements of both polities deployed emergency politics in order to empower the executive and strengthen the center. While both polities succeeded in arresting the forces of fragmentation, their use of emergency politics has led to different outcomes. While the locus of power in the EU has remained diffuse and difficult to identify, in the context of the Chinese Party-state the result has been a strengthening of the central authorities.