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Article: Definable and Contractible Contracts
Title | Definable and Contractible Contracts |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Contract theory Definability Folk theorem |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Citation | Econometrica, 2012, v. 80, n. 1, p. 363-411 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer. © 2012 The Econometric Society. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329238 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 17.701 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Peters, Michael | - |
dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:31:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:31:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Econometrica, 2012, v. 80, n. 1, p. 363-411 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0012-9682 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329238 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer. © 2012 The Econometric Society. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Econometrica | - |
dc.subject | Contract theory | - |
dc.subject | Definability | - |
dc.subject | Folk theorem | - |
dc.title | Definable and Contractible Contracts | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.3982/ECTA8375 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84855719654 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 80 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 363 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 411 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1468-0262 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000298957400009 | - |