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- Publisher Website: 10.1257/pol.20200873
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85152125216
- WOS: WOS:000932140100006
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Article: SOEs and Soft Incentive Constraints in State Bank Lending
Title | SOEs and Soft Incentive Constraints in State Bank Lending |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2023 |
Citation | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2023, v. 15, n. 1, p. 174-195 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329938 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.519 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cao, Yiming | - |
dc.contributor.author | Fisman, Raymond | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lin, Hui | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Yongxiang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:36:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:36:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2023, v. 15, n. 1, p. 174-195 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7731 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329938 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy | - |
dc.title | SOEs and Soft Incentive Constraints in State Bank Lending | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/pol.20200873 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85152125216 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 15 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 174 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 195 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1945-774X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000932140100006 | - |