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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00530-4
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0242516512
- WOS: WOS:000183831600006
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Article: Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra
Title | Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Equilibrium Exposure problem First-price Second-price |
Issue Date | 2003 |
Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 44, n. 1, p. 114-133 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the bidders' marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third. In all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two-dimensional, and it surrounds a three-dimensional set of best responses. This appears to be a previously unknown structure. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330043 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rosenthal, Robert W. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:37:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:37:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 44, n. 1, p. 114-133 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330043 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the bidders' marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third. In all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two-dimensional, and it surrounds a three-dimensional set of best responses. This appears to be a previously unknown structure. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
dc.subject | Equilibrium | - |
dc.subject | Exposure problem | - |
dc.subject | First-price | - |
dc.subject | Second-price | - |
dc.title | Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00530-4 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0242516512 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 44 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 114 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 133 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000183831600006 | - |