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Article: Training and union wages

TitleTraining and union wages
Authors
Issue Date2009
Citation
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2009, v. 91, n. 2, p. 363-376 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper investigates whether unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and firm-financed training, we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms. We test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data. We find support for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs. © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/330349
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 6.481
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.999
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDustmann, Christian-
dc.contributor.authorSchönberg, Uta-
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-05T12:09:50Z-
dc.date.available2023-09-05T12:09:50Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationReview of Economics and Statistics, 2009, v. 91, n. 2, p. 363-376-
dc.identifier.issn0034-6535-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/330349-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and firm-financed training, we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms. We test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data. We find support for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs. © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economics and Statistics-
dc.titleTraining and union wages-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/rest.91.2.363-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-70449427846-
dc.identifier.volume91-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage363-
dc.identifier.epage376-
dc.identifier.eissn1530-9142-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000266229700009-

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