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- Publisher Website: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001144
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84982311277
- WOS: WOS:000383131000004
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Article: Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions
Title | Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Abnormally low bids criterion Bid scoring formula Capped auctions Competitive bidding Construction auctions Contracting Economic bid weighting Scoring rule |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Citation | Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2016, v. 142, n. 9, article no. 04016035 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in best value or multiattribute construction auctions, in which both the (dollar) bid and technical nonprice criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula, and abnormally low bids criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders' competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner's desired strategic outcomes. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/333190 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.071 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Skitmore, Martin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Pellicer, Eugenio | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Xiaoling | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-06T05:17:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-10-06T05:17:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2016, v. 142, n. 9, article no. 04016035 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0733-9364 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/333190 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in best value or multiattribute construction auctions, in which both the (dollar) bid and technical nonprice criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula, and abnormally low bids criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders' competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner's desired strategic outcomes. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Construction Engineering and Management | - |
dc.subject | Abnormally low bids criterion | - |
dc.subject | Bid scoring formula | - |
dc.subject | Capped auctions | - |
dc.subject | Competitive bidding | - |
dc.subject | Construction auctions | - |
dc.subject | Contracting | - |
dc.subject | Economic bid weighting | - |
dc.subject | Scoring rule | - |
dc.title | Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001144 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84982311277 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 142 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 9 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 04016035 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 04016035 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000383131000004 | - |