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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/bjc/azx021
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85033443703
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Article: We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets
Title | We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Cryptomarkets Cybercrime Deterrence Drug trade Illegal markets Mass media Punishment |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Citation | British Journal of Criminology, 2018, v. 58, n. 2, p. 414-433 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement's public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context-digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/344478 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.045 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ladegaard, Isak | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-31T03:03:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-31T03:03:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | British Journal of Criminology, 2018, v. 58, n. 2, p. 414-433 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0007-0955 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/344478 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement's public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context-digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | British Journal of Criminology | - |
dc.subject | Cryptomarkets | - |
dc.subject | Cybercrime | - |
dc.subject | Deterrence | - |
dc.subject | Drug trade | - |
dc.subject | Illegal markets | - |
dc.subject | Mass media | - |
dc.subject | Punishment | - |
dc.title | We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/bjc/azx021 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85033443703 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 58 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 414 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 433 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1464-3529 | - |