Battle to Survive: The Association Between Accountability and Chinese Local Government Response to COVID-19

Abstract

China’s ability to sustain the zero-COVID strategy over three years has garnered global attention, but little is known about the factors contributing to its long-term adherence. Based on the political promotion tournament model, this article theorizes that China’s strict administrative accountability system, which tied local officials’ career prospects to their performance in crucial policy goals, incentivized local governments to sustain COVID-19 policies. Using data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker and major official Chinese media outlets, we performed interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) to examine whether the accountability events affected the local government’s COVID-19 responses. Noticeably, our analyses found that from May 4, 2020, to September 30, 2022, when an accountability event happened, officials in the affected (local effects) and unaffected (spillover effects) provinces all increased their containment responses and decreased their economic support responses. This is true even for provinces without new localized outbreaks. The effects of accountability events increased with decreasing geographical distance. These findings remain consistent after several robustness checks. The administrative accountability system is a key institutional factor in implementing China’s zero-COVID strategy, which contributed to the global literature about the pandemic policy process in centralized countries.