Authoritarian cue effect of state repression

Abstract

State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitudes toward state repression can be endogenously shaped by instances of state repression, which may be interpreted as cueing messages signaling the regime's disapproval of the punished behaviors. Using a novel belief correction survey experiment, we empirically demonstrate that state repression can induce the public to pick up on cues and automatically adopt the state's stance, perceiving repressed behavior as having more negative externalities and supporting state repression more. This cue effect suggests that authoritarian state repression can self-legitimize and evade public opinion backlash in a less costly manner than previously presumed.