On Aristotle's hylomorphic theory of change : a philosophical investigation

Abstract

The research of this thesis is conducted under the trend of interpreting Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism in terms of modern science and applying it to solve contemporary philosophical problems.

This thesis majorly discusses Aristotle’s answers to the following basic problems about change with his doctrine of hylomorphism: (i) How change is possible? (ii) If change is possible, then how substantial change is possible? (iii) What is the nature of change? The major goal of the thesis is to show that Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory of change correctly depicts the nature of change (at least the very change in our common sense), in particular, it captures the dynamic nature of change, in virtue of which, it is superior to some notable contemporary theories of change. To achieve this goal, we put forward a distinctive interpretation of how Aristotle invokes his theory of the principles of change to solve the Parmenidean puzzle about change, as well as bringing his hylomorphic theory of change into the contemporary context and arguing that it is better than the perdurantist theories and some other endurantist theories of persistence and change. Specifically, in the first chapter, we give a review of the dispute over the persistence of the subject of change, which reveals different understandings of how Aristotle invokes his theory of the principles of change to solve the Parmenidean puzzle. We conclude that the traditional argument for the persisting subject is flawed. In the second chapter, we first put forward an alternative argument for the persisting subject, according to which it is the dynamic nature of change that necessitates something’s persisting through the change, and an essential role of the subject of change is to ground the dynamic nature of change. Then we reexamine Aristotle’s solution to the Parmenidean puzzle and argue that the true force of the puzzle is not how to distinguish change from sheer replacement but how to accommodate the subject of change so as to ground the dynamic nature of change. Third, given that every instance of change presupposes some persisting subject, we argue that Aristotle’s recognition of substantial change is not a trivial move. In the third chapter, in order to justify the possibility of substantial change, we clarify the ternary relation of hylomorphic composition, i.e., the hylomorphic composite substance-matter- substantial form relationship, by illustrating how Aristotle invokes this sort of relation to solve a puzzle about definition. In the fourth chapter, we argue that perdurantism does not offer us a proper way to explain change, for it fails to depict the dynamic nature of change. Then we develop a more specific account of the nature of the Aristotelian subject of change and how it persists and changes. Besides, we compare our interpretation to Brower’s and argue that ours is immune to an objection to Brower’s and captures the dynamic nature of change which Brower’s cannot do.