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Article: Compassionate and Cognitively Diverse: Why Kantian Virtue is More Generous Than You Think
| Title | Compassionate and Cognitively Diverse: Why Kantian Virtue is More Generous Than You Think |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | compassion ethics feeling Kant moral motivation |
| Issue Date | 1-Sep-2024 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Citation | Think: Philosophy for everyone, 2024, v. 23, n. 68, p. 37-43 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | People have often thought that Kant left no room for compassion in the virtuous life, because virtue for him is about doing the right thing when you don’t feel like it. However, compassion is an important virtue in Kantian ethics, where it is understood as a form of moral cognition grounded in a commitment to act for the good of others. Though this means that the Kantian virtue of compassion is primarily intellectual in nature, contrary to what people have thought, the virtuous person can experience great feelings of compassion, affection and pleasure. And yet, these feelings are not strictly necessary for someone to have the virtue. For this reason, some, for example neurodiverse, agents who would not qualify as virtuous on the Aristotelian picture do qualify as virtuous on the Kantian picture. This expands the traditional virtue label in a good way. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/355998 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.2 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Hildebrand, Carl | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-05-20T00:35:14Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-05-20T00:35:14Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-09-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Think: Philosophy for everyone, 2024, v. 23, n. 68, p. 37-43 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1477-1756 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/355998 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | People have often thought that Kant left no room for compassion in the virtuous life, because virtue for him is about doing the right thing when you don’t feel like it. However, compassion is an important virtue in Kantian ethics, where it is understood as a form of moral cognition grounded in a commitment to act for the good of others. Though this means that the Kantian virtue of compassion is primarily intellectual in nature, contrary to what people have thought, the virtuous person can experience great feelings of compassion, affection and pleasure. And yet, these feelings are not strictly necessary for someone to have the virtue. For this reason, some, for example neurodiverse, agents who would not qualify as virtuous on the Aristotelian picture do qualify as virtuous on the Kantian picture. This expands the traditional virtue label in a good way. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Think: Philosophy for everyone | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.subject | compassion | - |
| dc.subject | ethics | - |
| dc.subject | feeling | - |
| dc.subject | Kant | - |
| dc.subject | moral motivation | - |
| dc.title | Compassionate and Cognitively Diverse: Why Kantian Virtue is More Generous Than You Think | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S1477175624000083 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-105003760159 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 23 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 68 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 37 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 43 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1755-1196 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:001470239000009 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 1477-1756 | - |
