Chinese military thinking of surprise

Abstract

China surprised its enemies in all its international wars since 1949: the 1950 Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Why was China able to repeatedly surprise opponents with vastly different political systems, cultural make-ups, and histories? Are there any unique elements in Chinese military thinking that might explain this? I argue that China’s opponents were surprised because Chinese military thinking has an obsession with the initiative that is based on three assumptions: (1) winning the first battle has a domino effect on winning the war; (2) flexible offensive plans can maximize the impact of the use of force; (3) advance preparation can neutralize tactical disadvantages. The first assumption incentivizes China to launch a secretive, swift, and resolute attack when it starts a war, and use deception to increase the possibility of success. The second assumption maximizes the freedom of action such that China can choose where, when, and how to attack. Thus, the opponents could hardly detect and prepare for the incoming attack. Unlike the two previous assumptions, advance preparation increases the possibility of achieving surprise passively. First, China’s war preparations may start well before a war breaks out. These preparations gradually become a routine in the eyes of decision-makers of the target state. As a result, the target state becomes less sensitive to imminent threats from China. Second, advance preparation allows Chinese military units to attack shortly after receiving orders. The shortened time lag between the decision to fight and the start of war makes it more difficult for the target state to detect signs of an incoming attack in time. This assumption is different from the first two assumptions: advance preparation lowers the alertness of imminent threats of the target state even when China did not intend to surprise its opponents. Thus, surprise is a side-product of the advance preparation, not the main objective. I use three cases studies to illustrate this theoretical framework. My analysis shows that the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War fit into the theoretical framework well. In comparison, the Sino-Vietnamese War only offers a handful of supporting evidence due to the limited access to the archives from both belligerents. This study makes three contributions to existing literature. First, the theoretical framework suggests that certain military thinking, or even strategic culture, makes it easier for a state to achieve surprise effect. Second, through its systematic and empirical study of Chinese military thinking, it provides new insights into the global literature on the subject of surprise. Furthermore, by developing a theoretical framework to explain why China wanted to use surprise, and why it succeeded, this thesis also contributes to the scholarship on China’s military thinking.