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- Publisher Website: 10.1002/bse.3571
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Article: CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms
| Title | CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | CEO tenure environmental fraud family CEOs family firms independent directors |
| Issue Date | 26-Sep-2023 |
| Publisher | Wiley |
| Citation | Business Strategy and the Environment, 2023 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer-serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non-family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357130 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 12.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.666 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Wang, Yang | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Yifei | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Chang, Xiao | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Kang, Wei | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-06-23T08:53:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-06-23T08:53:33Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-09-26 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Business Strategy and the Environment, 2023 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0964-4733 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357130 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer-serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non-family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms.</p> | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Business Strategy and the Environment | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.subject | CEO tenure | - |
| dc.subject | environmental fraud | - |
| dc.subject | family CEOs | - |
| dc.subject | family firms | - |
| dc.subject | independent directors | - |
| dc.title | CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/bse.3571 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85172146442 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1099-0836 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:001070768100001 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0964-4733 | - |
