File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms

TitleCEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms
Authors
KeywordsCEO tenure
environmental fraud
family CEOs
family firms
independent directors
Issue Date26-Sep-2023
PublisherWiley
Citation
Business Strategy and the Environment, 2023 How to Cite?
Abstract

This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer-serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non-family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms.


Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/357130
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 12.5
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.666
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, Yang-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Yifei-
dc.contributor.authorChang, Xiao-
dc.contributor.authorKang, Wei -
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-23T08:53:33Z-
dc.date.available2025-06-23T08:53:33Z-
dc.date.issued2023-09-26-
dc.identifier.citationBusiness Strategy and the Environment, 2023-
dc.identifier.issn0964-4733-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/357130-
dc.description.abstract<p>This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer-serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non-family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms.</p>-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherWiley-
dc.relation.ispartofBusiness Strategy and the Environment-
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectCEO tenure-
dc.subjectenvironmental fraud-
dc.subjectfamily CEOs-
dc.subjectfamily firms-
dc.subjectindependent directors-
dc.titleCEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/bse.3571-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85172146442-
dc.identifier.eissn1099-0836-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:001070768100001-
dc.identifier.issnl0964-4733-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats