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Article: Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources
| Title | Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 1-May-2025 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association |
| Citation | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, v. 17, n. 2, p. 162-213 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | We study the role of endogenous trust in amplifying ideological bias. Agents in our model learn a sequence of states from sources whose accuracy is ex ante uncertain. Agents learn these accuracies by comparing their own reasoning about the states based on introspection or direct experience to the sources' reports. Small biases in this reasoning can cause large ideological differences in the agents' trust in information sources and their beliefs about the states, and may lead agents to become overconfident in their own reasoning. Disagreements can be similar in magnitude whether agents see only ideologically aligned sources or diverse sources. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357506 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.835 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Gentzkow, Matthew | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Wong, Michael B | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Allen T | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-22T03:13:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-07-22T03:13:10Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-05-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, v. 17, n. 2, p. 162-213 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7669 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357506 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>We study the role of endogenous trust in amplifying ideological bias. Agents in our model learn a sequence of states from sources whose accuracy is ex ante uncertain. Agents learn these accuracies by comparing their own reasoning about the states based on introspection or direct experience to the sources' reports. Small biases in this reasoning can cause large ideological differences in the agents' trust in information sources and their beliefs about the states, and may lead agents to become overconfident in their own reasoning. Disagreements can be similar in magnitude whether agents see only ideologically aligned sources or diverse sources.<br></p> | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | American Economic Association | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.title | Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/mic.20210406 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 17 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 162 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 213 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1945-7685 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:001489751000006 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 1945-7669 | - |