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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2025.103776
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-105014027768
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Article: Government regulations for ride-sourcing services as substitute or complement to public transit
| Title | Government regulations for ride-sourcing services as substitute or complement to public transit |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | First/last-mile problem Government regulation Public transit Ride-sourcing services |
| Issue Date | 1-Oct-2025 |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Citation | Transport Policy, 2025, v. 172 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | The rapid expansion of on-demand ride-sourcing services has revolutionized the landscape of multi-modal urban transport systems, particularly with regard to the public transit system. Ride-sourcing services can be either a substitute or complement to public transit. Regarding the complementary effects, ride-sourcing services can address first/last-mile problem to enhance public transit ridership, which aligns with the objective of the government to coordinate multiple travel modes. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model to characterize the complementary and substitution relationships between ride-sourcing and public transit services. Three market scenarios are compared and analyzed, including the laissez-faire market without government intervention, the market under a price-cap regulation, and the market under a subsidy policy. The insights could help understand how government regulations affect ride-sourcing platforms’ profit-pursuing decisions and the resulting social benefits, such as public transit ridership. Finally, we offer practical suggestions for the government to design the appropriate regulations to better coordinate ride-sourcing and public transit services, under situations with different demand-supply ratios. We prove that when the demand-supply ratio is high enough, it is unnecessary to introduce any regulation to promote public transit, whereas at a medium ratio, the government is able to set a critical value of decision variables in each policy such that all travelers use public transit. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/360858 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.3 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.742 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Qin, Xiaoran | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Ke, Jintao | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Yang, Hai | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-16T00:30:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-09-16T00:30:57Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-10-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Transport Policy, 2025, v. 172 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0967-070X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/360858 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>The rapid expansion of on-demand ride-sourcing services has revolutionized the landscape of multi-modal urban transport systems, particularly with regard to the public transit system. Ride-sourcing services can be either a substitute or complement to public transit. Regarding the complementary effects, ride-sourcing services can address first/last-mile problem to enhance public transit ridership, which aligns with the objective of the government to coordinate multiple travel modes. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model to characterize the complementary and substitution relationships between ride-sourcing and public transit services. Three market scenarios are compared and analyzed, including the laissez-faire market without government intervention, the market under a price-cap regulation, and the market under a subsidy policy. The insights could help understand how government regulations affect ride-sourcing platforms’ profit-pursuing decisions and the resulting social benefits, such as public transit ridership. Finally, we offer practical suggestions for the government to design the appropriate regulations to better coordinate ride-sourcing and public transit services, under situations with different demand-supply ratios. We prove that when the demand-supply ratio is high enough, it is unnecessary to introduce any regulation to promote public transit, whereas at a medium ratio, the government is able to set a critical value of decision variables in each policy such that all travelers use public transit.</p> | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Transport Policy | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.subject | First/last-mile problem | - |
| dc.subject | Government regulation | - |
| dc.subject | Public transit | - |
| dc.subject | Ride-sourcing services | - |
| dc.title | Government regulations for ride-sourcing services as substitute or complement to public transit | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.tranpol.2025.103776 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-105014027768 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 172 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0967-070X | - |
