File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1111/mafi.70006
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-105013779735
- Find via

Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Scopus: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Efficiency in Pure-Exchange Economies With Risk-Averse Monetary Utilities
| Title | Efficiency in Pure-Exchange Economies With Risk-Averse Monetary Utilities |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | monetary utilities Pareto efficiency risk aversion risk sharing Schur concavity |
| Issue Date | 2025 |
| Citation | Mathematical Finance, 2025 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | We study Pareto efficiency in a pure-exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk-averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law-invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of monotone, (quasi-)concave, Schur concave, and translation-invariant utility functionals. This covers a large class of utility functionals, including a variety of law-invariant robust utilities. Given that Pareto optima exist and are comonotone, we provide a crisp characterization thereof in the case of law-invariant positively homogeneous monetary utilities. This characterization provides an easily implementable algorithm that fully determines the shape of Pareto-optimal (PO) allocations. In the special case of law-invariant comonotone-additive monetary utility functionals (concave Yaari-dual utilities), we provide a closed-form characterization of Pareto optima. As an application, we examine risk-sharing markets where all agents evaluate risk through law-invariant coherent risk measures, a widely popular class of risk measures. In a numerical illustration, we characterize PO risk-sharing for some special types of coherent risk measures. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/365657 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.616 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Ghossoub, Mario | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhu, Michael B. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-11-05T09:46:39Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-11-05T09:46:39Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Mathematical Finance, 2025 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0960-1627 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/365657 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We study Pareto efficiency in a pure-exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk-averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law-invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of monotone, (quasi-)concave, Schur concave, and translation-invariant utility functionals. This covers a large class of utility functionals, including a variety of law-invariant robust utilities. Given that Pareto optima exist and are comonotone, we provide a crisp characterization thereof in the case of law-invariant positively homogeneous monetary utilities. This characterization provides an easily implementable algorithm that fully determines the shape of Pareto-optimal (PO) allocations. In the special case of law-invariant comonotone-additive monetary utility functionals (concave Yaari-dual utilities), we provide a closed-form characterization of Pareto optima. As an application, we examine risk-sharing markets where all agents evaluate risk through law-invariant coherent risk measures, a widely popular class of risk measures. In a numerical illustration, we characterize PO risk-sharing for some special types of coherent risk measures. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Mathematical Finance | - |
| dc.subject | monetary utilities | - |
| dc.subject | Pareto efficiency | - |
| dc.subject | risk aversion | - |
| dc.subject | risk sharing | - |
| dc.subject | Schur concavity | - |
| dc.title | Efficiency in Pure-Exchange Economies With Risk-Averse Monetary Utilities | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/mafi.70006 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-105013779735 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1467-9965 | - |
