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Article: SARS: Hospital infection control and admission strategies

TitleSARS: Hospital infection control and admission strategies
Authors
KeywordsHandwashing
Infection control
Patient isolation
Severe acute respiratory syndrome
Transmission
Issue Date2003
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/RES
Citation
Respirology, 2003, v. 8, p. S41-S45 How to Cite?
AbstractNosocomial clustering with transmission to health care workers, patients and visitors is a prominent feature of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Hospital outbreaks of SARS typically occurred within the first week after admission of the very first SARS cases when the disease was not recognized and before isolation measures were implemented. In the majority of nosocomial infections, there was a history of close contact with a SARS patient, and transmission occurred via large droplets, direct contact with infectious material or by contact with fomites contaminated by infectious material. In a few instances, potential airborne transmission was reported in association with endotracheal intubation, nebulised medications and non-invasive positive pressure ventilation of SARS patients. In all SARS-affected countries, nosocomial transmission of the disease was effectively halted by enforcement of routine standard, contact and droplet precautions in all clinical areas and additional airborne precautions in the high-risk areas. In Hong Kong, where there are few private rooms for patient isolation, some hospitals have obtained good outcome by having designated SARS teams and separate wards for patient triage, confirmed SARS cases and step-down of patients in whom SARS had been ruled out. In conclusion, SARS represents one of the new challenges for those who are involved in hospital infection control. As SARS might re-emerge, all hospitals should take advantage of the current SARS-free interval to review their infection control programmes, alert mechanisms, response capability and to repair any identified inadequacies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/79187
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 6.175
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.857
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHo, PLen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTang, XPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSeto, WHen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T07:51:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T07:51:39Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_HK
dc.identifier.citationRespirology, 2003, v. 8, p. S41-S45en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1323-7799en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/79187-
dc.description.abstractNosocomial clustering with transmission to health care workers, patients and visitors is a prominent feature of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Hospital outbreaks of SARS typically occurred within the first week after admission of the very first SARS cases when the disease was not recognized and before isolation measures were implemented. In the majority of nosocomial infections, there was a history of close contact with a SARS patient, and transmission occurred via large droplets, direct contact with infectious material or by contact with fomites contaminated by infectious material. In a few instances, potential airborne transmission was reported in association with endotracheal intubation, nebulised medications and non-invasive positive pressure ventilation of SARS patients. In all SARS-affected countries, nosocomial transmission of the disease was effectively halted by enforcement of routine standard, contact and droplet precautions in all clinical areas and additional airborne precautions in the high-risk areas. In Hong Kong, where there are few private rooms for patient isolation, some hospitals have obtained good outcome by having designated SARS teams and separate wards for patient triage, confirmed SARS cases and step-down of patients in whom SARS had been ruled out. In conclusion, SARS represents one of the new challenges for those who are involved in hospital infection control. As SARS might re-emerge, all hospitals should take advantage of the current SARS-free interval to review their infection control programmes, alert mechanisms, response capability and to repair any identified inadequacies.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/RESen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofRespirologyen_HK
dc.subjectHandwashing-
dc.subjectInfection control-
dc.subjectPatient isolation-
dc.subjectSevere acute respiratory syndrome-
dc.subjectTransmission-
dc.subject.meshAlgorithmsen_HK
dc.subject.meshCross Infection - prevention & controlen_HK
dc.subject.meshHong Kongen_HK
dc.subject.meshHumansen_HK
dc.subject.meshInfection Control - methodsen_HK
dc.subject.meshPatient Admissionen_HK
dc.subject.meshSevere Acute Respiratory Syndrome - prevention & controlen_HK
dc.subject.meshTriageen_HK
dc.titleSARS: Hospital infection control and admission strategiesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1323-7799&volume=Suppl&spage=S41&epage=5&date=2003&atitle=SARS:+hospital+infection+control+and+admission+strategies.en_HK
dc.identifier.emailHo, PL:plho@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityHo, PL=rp00406en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1046/j.1440-1843.2003.00523.xen_HK
dc.identifier.pmid15018133-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0347624086en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros95447en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0347624086&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume8en_HK
dc.identifier.spageS41en_HK
dc.identifier.epageS45en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000187345100010-
dc.publisher.placeAustraliaen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHo, PL=7402211363en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTang, XP=8442040100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSeto, WH=35293452400en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl1323-7799-

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