File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership

TitleBargaining, bonding, and partial ownership
Authors
Dasgupta, STao, Z
KeywordsSpecific investment
General investment
Bargaining
Contracts
Partial ownership
Issue Date2000
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598
Citation
International Economic Review, 2000, v. 41 n. 3, p. 609-635 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00078
AbstractThis article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85770
ISSN
0020-6598
2023 Impact Factor: 1.5
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.350
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000088334400003
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Sen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:09:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:09:03Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Economic Review, 2000, v. 41 n. 3, p. 609-635en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85770-
dc.description.abstractThis article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Economic Reviewen_HK
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com-
dc.subjectSpecific investment-
dc.subjectGeneral investment-
dc.subjectBargaining-
dc.subjectContracts-
dc.subjectPartial ownership-
dc.titleBargaining, bonding, and partial ownershipen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0020-6598&volume=41&issue=3&spage=609&epage=635&date=2000&atitle=Bargaining,+bonding,+and+partial+ownershipen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1468-2354.00078-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0346048018en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros113910en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros58519-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0346048018&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume41en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage609en_HK
dc.identifier.epage635en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000088334400003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDasgupta, S=7202154679en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0020-6598-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats

OR

Export to Other Non-XML Formats