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Article: An agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China

TitleAn agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China
Authors
Tao, ZZhu, T
KeywordsAgency
China
Contract enforcement
D23
Economic transition
Interfirm transactions
K12
P31
P52
Issue Date2001
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chieco
Citation
China Economic Review, 2001, v. 12 n. 1, p. 1-14 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1043-951X(01)00040-2
AbstractThis paper offers a theory to explain in the Chinese context how interfirm transactions can be effectively carried out in the absence of a sound contract enforcement system. Noting that the development of China's nonstate sector, the primary contributor to its rapid economic growth, has relied heavily on its transactional relationships with the state sector, we develop an agency theory of interfirm transactions based on the following idea: a state enterprise manager, being an agent, may acquire private benefits in exchange for not holding up a nonstate trading partner; and this, in turn, improves the latter's incentive for transaction-specific investments. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85844
ISSN
1043-951X
2021 Impact Factor: 4.744
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.361
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000169467900001
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Ten_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:09:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:09:54Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_HK
dc.identifier.citationChina Economic Review, 2001, v. 12 n. 1, p. 1-14en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1043-951Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85844-
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a theory to explain in the Chinese context how interfirm transactions can be effectively carried out in the absence of a sound contract enforcement system. Noting that the development of China's nonstate sector, the primary contributor to its rapid economic growth, has relied heavily on its transactional relationships with the state sector, we develop an agency theory of interfirm transactions based on the following idea: a state enterprise manager, being an agent, may acquire private benefits in exchange for not holding up a nonstate trading partner; and this, in turn, improves the latter's incentive for transaction-specific investments. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chiecoen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofChina Economic Reviewen_HK
dc.subjectAgencyen_HK
dc.subjectChinaen_HK
dc.subjectContract enforcementen_HK
dc.subjectD23en_HK
dc.subjectEconomic transitionen_HK
dc.subjectInterfirm transactionsen_HK
dc.subjectK12en_HK
dc.subjectP31en_HK
dc.subjectP52en_HK
dc.titleAn agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of Chinaen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S1043-951X(01)00040-2en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0008073457en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros58881en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0008073457&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume12en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1en_HK
dc.identifier.epage14en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000169467900001-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhu, T=7202748304en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl1043-951X-

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