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Conference Paper: A truthful (1-ɛ)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning
Title | A truthful (1-ɛ)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning |
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Other Titles | A truthful (1-epsilon)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning |
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2015 |
Publisher | IEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779 |
Citation | The 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9 How to Cite? |
Abstract | On-demand resource provisioning in cloud computing provides tailor-made resource packages (typically in the form of VMs) to meet users’ demands. Public clouds nowadays provide more and more elaborated types of VMs, but have yet to offer the most flexible dynamic VM assembly, which is partly due to the lack of a mature mechanism for pricing tailor-made VMs on the spot. This work proposes an efficient randomized auction mechanism based on a novel application of smoothed analysis and randomized reduction, for dynamic VM provisioning and pricing in geo-distributed cloud data centers. This auction, to the best of our knowledge, is the first one in literature that achieves (i) truthfulness in expectation, (ii) polynomial running time in expectation, and (iii) (1-ɛ)-optimal social welfare in expectation for resource allocation, where ɛ can be arbitrarily close to 0. Our mechanism consists of three modules: (1) an exact algorithm to solve the NP-hard social welfare maximization problem, which runs in polynomial time in expectation, (2) a perturbation-based randomized resource allocation scheme which produces a VM provisioning solution that is (1-ɛ)-optimal and (3) an auction mechanism that applies the perturbation-based scheme for dynamic VM provisioning and prices the customized VMs using a randomized VCG payment, with a guarantee in truthfulness in expectation. We validate the efficacy of the mechanism through careful theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulations. |
Description | Session: Resource Provisioning in Cloud Computing |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/213546 |
ISBN | |
ISSN | 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.865 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zhang, X | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wu, C | - |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Z | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lau, FCM | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-05T04:17:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-05T04:17:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781479983810 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0743-166X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/213546 | - |
dc.description | Session: Resource Provisioning in Cloud Computing | - |
dc.description.abstract | On-demand resource provisioning in cloud computing provides tailor-made resource packages (typically in the form of VMs) to meet users’ demands. Public clouds nowadays provide more and more elaborated types of VMs, but have yet to offer the most flexible dynamic VM assembly, which is partly due to the lack of a mature mechanism for pricing tailor-made VMs on the spot. This work proposes an efficient randomized auction mechanism based on a novel application of smoothed analysis and randomized reduction, for dynamic VM provisioning and pricing in geo-distributed cloud data centers. This auction, to the best of our knowledge, is the first one in literature that achieves (i) truthfulness in expectation, (ii) polynomial running time in expectation, and (iii) (1-ɛ)-optimal social welfare in expectation for resource allocation, where ɛ can be arbitrarily close to 0. Our mechanism consists of three modules: (1) an exact algorithm to solve the NP-hard social welfare maximization problem, which runs in polynomial time in expectation, (2) a perturbation-based randomized resource allocation scheme which produces a VM provisioning solution that is (1-ɛ)-optimal and (3) an auction mechanism that applies the perturbation-based scheme for dynamic VM provisioning and prices the customized VMs using a randomized VCG payment, with a guarantee in truthfulness in expectation. We validate the efficacy of the mechanism through careful theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulations. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | IEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) | - |
dc.title | A truthful (1-ɛ)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning | - |
dc.title.alternative | A truthful (1-epsilon)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Lau, FCM: fcmlau@cs.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wu, C=rp01397 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Lau, FCM=rp00221 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218478 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84954230850 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 246573 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 9 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.customcontrol.immutable | sml 150805 | - |
dc.customcontrol.immutable | csl 180914 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0743-166X | - |