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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.005
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-34250682281
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Article: Reserve price signaling
Title | Reserve price signaling |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Signaling Reserve price Auctions |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, v. 135, n. 1, p. 253-268 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241890 |
ISSN | 2021 Impact Factor: 1.790 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.689 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Riley, John | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ye, Lixin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:56:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:56:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, v. 135, n. 1, p. 253-268 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241890 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | - |
dc.subject | Signaling | - |
dc.subject | Reserve price | - |
dc.subject | Auctions | - |
dc.title | Reserve price signaling | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.005 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-34250682281 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 135 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 253 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 268 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1095-7235 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000248395200013 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |