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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/1756-2171.12028
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Article: China's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption?
Title | China's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption? |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, v. 44, n. 3, p. 488-521 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or "two-stage" auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are "taken," deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two-stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two-stage auctions. © 2013, RAND. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241901 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.860 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Henderson, J. Vernon | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Qinghua | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:56:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:56:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, v. 44, n. 3, p. 488-521 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241901 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or "two-stage" auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are "taken," deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two-stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two-stage auctions. © 2013, RAND. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | RAND Journal of Economics | - |
dc.title | China's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1756-2171.12028 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84889691175 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 44 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 488 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 521 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1756-2171 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000328218700005 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0741-6261 | - |