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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00029.x
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Article: Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
Title | Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2004 |
Citation | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004, v. 13, n. 4, p. 703-729 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241907 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.961 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Cont, Walter | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:56:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:56:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004, v. 13, n. 4, p. 703-729 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1058-6407 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241907 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | - |
dc.title | Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00029.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-9444278380 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 13 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 703 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 729 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000224433900007 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1058-6407 | - |