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Article: 'Big Tigers, Big Data:' Learning Social Reactions to China’s Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback

Title'Big Tigers, Big Data:' Learning Social Reactions to China’s Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Citation
Public Administration Review, 2019, v. 79 n. 4, p. 500-513 How to Cite?
AbstractThis study examines the effect of campaign-style anticorruption on political support using the case of China’s most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high-ranking officials, or the “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of over 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the campaign significantly exceeds that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses show that support for the leaders vis-à-vis intuitions increases with the tigers’ party ranking. Findings suggest that while campaign-style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long-term corruption control.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/245896
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 8.144
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.721
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhu, J-
dc.contributor.authorHuang, H-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, D-
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-18T02:18:48Z-
dc.date.available2017-09-18T02:18:48Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationPublic Administration Review, 2019, v. 79 n. 4, p. 500-513-
dc.identifier.issn0033-3352-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/245896-
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the effect of campaign-style anticorruption on political support using the case of China’s most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high-ranking officials, or the “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of over 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the campaign significantly exceeds that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses show that support for the leaders vis-à-vis intuitions increases with the tigers’ party ranking. Findings suggest that while campaign-style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long-term corruption control.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.-
dc.relation.ispartofPublic Administration Review-
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.title'Big Tigers, Big Data:' Learning Social Reactions to China’s Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/puar.12866-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85069677616-
dc.identifier.hkuros276121-
dc.identifier.volumeEpub of 2017-
dc.identifier.volume79-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage500-
dc.identifier.epage513-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000477670200005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.issnl0033-3352-

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