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Article: Knowledge and Normality

TitleKnowledge and Normality
Authors
KeywordsKnowledge
Conceptual engineering
Epistemology
Normality
Issue Date2020
PublisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0039-7857
Citation
Synthese, 2020 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper, we propose a general constraint on theories of knowledge that we call ‘normalism’. Normalism is a view about the epistemic threshold that separates knowledge from mere true belief; its basic claim is that one knows only if one has at least a normal amount of epistemic support for one’s belief. We argue that something like normalism is required to do full justice to the normative role of knowledge in many key everyday practices, such as assertion, inquiry, and testimony. The view of normality we employ to flesh out this claim is inspired by experimental work on the folk notion of normality, which suggests that folk judgments of what is ‘normal’ are based upon both statistical averages as well as normative ideals within the relevant target domain. Adopting this notion of normality to set the threshold for knowledge results in a view upon which knowledge is routinely available on an everyday basis without being a merely trivial achievement. We explore several interesting consequences of this view, including the implication that the threshold for knowing may change as, e.g., the ease of availability of information in an epistemic community changes over time. The result is a ‘shifty’ view of knowledge which nonetheless retains more stability than standard contextualist or pragmatic encroachment approaches.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285387
ISSN
2019 Impact Factor: 1.436
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.703
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHorvath, J-
dc.contributor.authorNado, J-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T03:52:59Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T03:52:59Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationSynthese, 2020-
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285387-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we propose a general constraint on theories of knowledge that we call ‘normalism’. Normalism is a view about the epistemic threshold that separates knowledge from mere true belief; its basic claim is that one knows only if one has at least a normal amount of epistemic support for one’s belief. We argue that something like normalism is required to do full justice to the normative role of knowledge in many key everyday practices, such as assertion, inquiry, and testimony. The view of normality we employ to flesh out this claim is inspired by experimental work on the folk notion of normality, which suggests that folk judgments of what is ‘normal’ are based upon both statistical averages as well as normative ideals within the relevant target domain. Adopting this notion of normality to set the threshold for knowledge results in a view upon which knowledge is routinely available on an everyday basis without being a merely trivial achievement. We explore several interesting consequences of this view, including the implication that the threshold for knowing may change as, e.g., the ease of availability of information in an epistemic community changes over time. The result is a ‘shifty’ view of knowledge which nonetheless retains more stability than standard contextualist or pragmatic encroachment approaches.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0039-7857-
dc.relation.ispartofSynthese-
dc.subjectKnowledge-
dc.subjectConceptual engineering-
dc.subjectEpistemology-
dc.subjectNormality-
dc.titleKnowledge and Normality-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailNado, J: nado@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityNado, J=rp02287-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-020-02823-9-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85089783499-
dc.identifier.hkuros312676-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000562362400001-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands-

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