File Download
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1086/703068
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85065193635
- WOS: WOS:000474803600013
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council
Title | Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | University of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/loi/jop |
Citation | The Journal of Politics, 2019, v. 81 n. 3, p. 892-905 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This article focuses on the manipulation of legislative rules in electoral authoritarian states. Electoral liberalization in authoritarian regimes creates the capacity for opposition forces to win legislative seats, but it does not ensure voice in the policy process. While the literature on institutional authoritarianism points to co-optation, dominant parties, and redistribution as mechanisms to control policy outcomes in authoritarian legislatures, we investigate an additional possibility: that electoral authoritarian regimes (EARs) select legislative institutions that allow free debate and unconstrained voting yet decouple electoral success from policy influence. Our analysis centers on the EAR in Hong Kong and its legislature, the Legislative Council (LegCo). We find that the LegCo’s rules of procedure interact with electoral institutions to create considerable roadblocks to opposition initiatives, while at the same time facilitating the enactment of regime policies. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/294133 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.792 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Smyth, R | - |
dc.contributor.author | Bianco, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Chan, KN | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-23T08:26:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-23T08:26:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The Journal of Politics, 2019, v. 81 n. 3, p. 892-905 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-3816 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/294133 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article focuses on the manipulation of legislative rules in electoral authoritarian states. Electoral liberalization in authoritarian regimes creates the capacity for opposition forces to win legislative seats, but it does not ensure voice in the policy process. While the literature on institutional authoritarianism points to co-optation, dominant parties, and redistribution as mechanisms to control policy outcomes in authoritarian legislatures, we investigate an additional possibility: that electoral authoritarian regimes (EARs) select legislative institutions that allow free debate and unconstrained voting yet decouple electoral success from policy influence. Our analysis centers on the EAR in Hong Kong and its legislature, the Legislative Council (LegCo). We find that the LegCo’s rules of procedure interact with electoral institutions to create considerable roadblocks to opposition initiatives, while at the same time facilitating the enactment of regime policies. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/loi/jop | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Journal of Politics | - |
dc.rights | The Journal of Politics. Copyright © University of Chicago Press. | - |
dc.title | Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chan, KN: kwachan@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chan, KN=rp02084 | - |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/703068 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85065193635 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 318925 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 81 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 892 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 905 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000474803600013 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |