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Article: The Optimal Investment Decision for an Innovative Supplier in a Supply Chain

TitleThe Optimal Investment Decision for an Innovative Supplier in a Supply Chain
Authors
Issue Date2020
Citation
European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, Forthcoming How to Cite?
AbstractWe study a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier who invests in innovation, which increases the value of products to users, and downstream manufacturers who sell to users. Analyzing a bargaining model, we find that the supplier should invest more in innovation under downstream competition than under a downstream monopoly if the supplier does not have strong bargaining power. However, if the supplier already has strong bargaining power, the supplier should make more innovation investment only if the downstream competition is relatively mild. Interestingly, we find that, if the supplier has strong bargaining power, intense competition between downstream manufacturers negatively impacts the supplier’s profit. Finally, we show that a stronger bargaining power may not always benefit manufacturers.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/294890

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, J-
dc.contributor.authorShin, H-
dc.contributor.authorZHOU, Q-
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-21T11:49:59Z-
dc.date.available2020-12-21T11:49:59Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 2020, Forthcoming-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/294890-
dc.description.abstractWe study a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier who invests in innovation, which increases the value of products to users, and downstream manufacturers who sell to users. Analyzing a bargaining model, we find that the supplier should invest more in innovation under downstream competition than under a downstream monopoly if the supplier does not have strong bargaining power. However, if the supplier already has strong bargaining power, the supplier should make more innovation investment only if the downstream competition is relatively mild. Interestingly, we find that, if the supplier has strong bargaining power, intense competition between downstream manufacturers negatively impacts the supplier’s profit. Finally, we show that a stronger bargaining power may not always benefit manufacturers.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Research-
dc.titleThe Optimal Investment Decision for an Innovative Supplier in a Supply Chain-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailWang, J: jingqi@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWang, J=rp01778-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2020.11.040-
dc.identifier.hkuros320611-
dc.identifier.volumeForthcoming-

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