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Conference Paper: The Effect of Board Overlap on Firm Behavior
Title | The Effect of Board Overlap on Firm Behavior |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Board interlock Corporate opportunity waivers Firm coordination JEL codes |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Publisher | Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
Citation | China International Conference in Finance (CICF) (Virtual), Shanghai, China, July 6-9, 2021. In 2021 China International Conference in Finance, July 6-9, 2021, Online and Onsite in Shanghai, China: Program notes and index of sessions, 2021 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The staggered introduction of Corporate Opportunity Waivers (COWs) in nine US
states since 2000 reduced legal risk to directors serving on multiple boards and
increased intra-industry board overlap in firms characterized by intensive R&D activity. More board overlap results in a higher return on assets, higher profit margins,
and higher sales revenues in spite of reduced factor inputs. The higher profitability
is observed equally for new board overlap with and without own-board alteration,
which rules out improved board quality as an explanation. Instead, higher profitability appears to originate in reduced firm rivalry measured by less innovation activity
and increased product market segmentation rather than the synergetic exploitation
of more and better corporate opportunities. |
Description | Session 53: Empirical Corporate Finance |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/314831 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Geng, H | - |
dc.contributor.author | Hau, H | - |
dc.contributor.author | Michaely, R | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ngyuen, B | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-05T09:35:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-05T09:35:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | China International Conference in Finance (CICF) (Virtual), Shanghai, China, July 6-9, 2021. In 2021 China International Conference in Finance, July 6-9, 2021, Online and Onsite in Shanghai, China: Program notes and index of sessions, 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/314831 | - |
dc.description | Session 53: Empirical Corporate Finance | - |
dc.description.abstract | The staggered introduction of Corporate Opportunity Waivers (COWs) in nine US states since 2000 reduced legal risk to directors serving on multiple boards and increased intra-industry board overlap in firms characterized by intensive R&D activity. More board overlap results in a higher return on assets, higher profit margins, and higher sales revenues in spite of reduced factor inputs. The higher profitability is observed equally for new board overlap with and without own-board alteration, which rules out improved board quality as an explanation. Instead, higher profitability appears to originate in reduced firm rivalry measured by less innovation activity and increased product market segmentation rather than the synergetic exploitation of more and better corporate opportunities. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | 2021 China International Conference in Finance, July 6-9, 2021, Online and Onsite in Shanghai, China: Program notes and index of sessions | - |
dc.subject | Board interlock | - |
dc.subject | Corporate opportunity waivers | - |
dc.subject | Firm coordination | - |
dc.subject | JEL codes | - |
dc.title | The Effect of Board Overlap on Firm Behavior | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Michaely, R: ronim@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 334920 | - |
dc.publisher.place | China | - |