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Article: Delegating decisions to experts

TitleDelegating decisions to experts
Authors
Li, HSuen, W
KeywordsBusiness and economics political science
Issue Date2004
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
Citation
Journal Of Political Economy, 2004, v. 112 n. 1, p. S311-S335 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/379941
AbstractWe present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information. © 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/42280
ISSN
0022-3808
2021 Impact Factor: 9.637
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 21.034
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000188954100011
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSuen, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-08T02:33:27Z-
dc.date.available2007-01-08T02:33:27Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Political Economy, 2004, v. 112 n. 1, p. S311-S335en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/42280-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information. © 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.en_HK
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dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economyen_HK
dc.rightsJournal of Political Economy. Copyright © University of Chicago Press.en_HK
dc.subjectBusiness and economics political scienceen_HK
dc.titleDelegating decisions to expertsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0022-3808&volume=112&issue=1 pt 2&spage=S311&epage=S335&date=2004&atitle=Delegating+Decisions+to+Expertsen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/379941en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-1842853859en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros91222-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-1842853859&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume112en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spageS311en_HK
dc.identifier.epageS335en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000188954100011-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, H=25960883900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0022-3808-

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